

Life in Johnstone's Topological Topos

Chris Grossack
(they/them)

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- Why care about this...?

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- Sometimes called “Brouwer’s Axiom” in the literature.

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- We'll give some quality-of-life axioms that \mathcal{T} satisfies, and explain why certain other quality-of-life axioms are false
- We'll give two proofs that Brouwer's Axiom holds in \mathcal{T} .

Let's get to it!

Defn

Write $\{1, \mathbb{N}_\infty\}$ for the full subcategory of \mathbf{Top} consisting of the objects 1 and $\mathbb{N}_\infty = \{1, \frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{3}, \frac{1}{4}, \dots, 0\}$ (the one point compactification of \mathbb{N})

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- The canonical topology says, roughly, that if every subsequence has a further subsequence converging to a limit, then the whole sequence converges to the same limit.
- So F is a “generalized sequential space”!

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
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- In \mathcal{T} , though, every set *is* a space! *Intrinsically!*
- No need to check continuity or to build new topologies from old. The topological structure is *automatic* and comes along for the ride! Our sets *themselves* are (possibly generalized) spaces!


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


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
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
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


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- The upwards arrows preserve finite products
- More structure as we move down





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- $1^{n0^\omega} \rightarrow 1^\omega$ but $\bigwedge 1^{n0^\omega} \not\rightarrow \bigwedge 1^\omega$

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- This is also easy to check by hand, if you prefer.

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- This is a common pattern. . . which we won't explore in this talk.

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This makes \mathcal{T} like a strong version of Solovay's Model

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- In fact there's another nonconstructive theorem that makes life in \mathcal{T} particularly nice:
- You may know that constructively it's preferable to work with *locales* rather than spaces.
- But also in \mathcal{T} everything is automatically a space...
- Can we say that the intrinsic topology on the points of a locale in \mathcal{T} agrees with the topology coming from the locale?

Thm: Yes (G.)

Let X be a regular locale. Let $X^{\mathcal{T}}$ be the \mathcal{T} -object of points of X (as computed in \mathcal{T}).

Then the intrinsic topology on $X^{\mathcal{T}}$ agrees with the “extrinsic” topology coming from the locale structure! In particular...

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- The object of dedekind reals in \mathcal{T} is represented by the reals with its usual topology

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- The object of dedekind reals in \mathcal{T} is represented by the reals with its usual topology
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This says, basically, that these objects behave the way you would expect!

Corollary: Bar and Fan Theorems

Internal to \mathcal{T} , the dedekind reals, cantor space, and baire space all have enough points!

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In \mathcal{T} , every function $\mathbb{R} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ is $(\epsilon\text{-}\delta)$ -continuous

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This is suddenly easy, since if $f : \mathbb{R} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ is a function in \mathcal{T} , it's intrinsically continuous. But the previous theorem tells us that intrinsic continuity agrees with localic continuity, which is the usual $\epsilon\text{-}\delta$ notion.

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- Recall that open subsets on a object of \mathcal{T} are in natural bijection with maps into Σ .
- Then if $f : X \rightarrow Y$ and $U : Y \rightarrow \Sigma$ is an open, pulling back along f always gives an open of X , called $U \circ f : X \rightarrow \Sigma$.

In fact, this idea lets us prove a souped-up version of Brouwer's Axiom:

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Cor: Brouwer's Axiom for Metric Spaces

If X and Y are any (external) metric spaces, they're regular locales, so the interpretation of X and Y in \mathcal{T} (as locales) agrees with their metric topology, thus every function $f : X \rightarrow Y$ is ϵ - δ continuous!

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But why stop there?

Defn (\approx Chapter 4 of Lešnik's PhD thesis)

Let (X, d) be an *internal* metric space. That is, $d : X \times X \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_{\geq 0}$ satisfying the usual axioms (as interpreted in the internal logic).

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Theorem: (4.58 in Lešnik's thesis, independently G .)

If (X, d) and (Y, d') are internal metric spaces and d intrinsically metrizes X , then \mathcal{T} proves that every function $X \rightarrow Y$ is $(\epsilon\text{-}\delta)$ continuous.

Thank You! ^ _ ^

- Grossack's Blog Post – “Life in Johnstone's Topological Topos (pts. 1,2,3)”
- Johnstone's Paper – “On a Topological Topos”
- Lešnik's PhD Thesis – “Synthetic Topology and Constructive” Metric Spaces